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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we provide a selective survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
overnight interbank markets.  We identify key results and questions arising from the literature, 
focussing particularly on the theoretical and empirical determinants of the overnight interest 
rate, and the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis.  To make the literature more accessible to 
a wider readership than those working directly in the field, we also include an overview of the 
broad institutional arrangements in overnight markets.  The research literature is large, but 
concentrated on the US Federal funds and the euro zone EONIA1 (including its predecessors 
in the euro zone countries); and we therefore focus particularly on these two markets.   
Trading in many frontier and emerging markets is relatively thin, and not sufficient to support 
fully a monetary policy based on open market operations.  There is therefore far less research 
on overnight markets in these countries2 .  There is, however, a considerable volume of 
research on interbank markets in general, especially following the 2007-08 financial crisis.  
For example, in a recent survey paper, Summer (2013) explains how network models of 
interbank exposures allow the mapping of the complex web of financial linkages among many 
institutions, in order to address issues of system stability and contagion risk.  There are also 
some interesting recent contributions that focus on emerging economies, including work by 
Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) on Mexico, the development of multi-agent financial network 
models for India by Markose (2013), work by Vazquez et al. (2012) on Brazil, and the 
research by León et al. (2015) on Colombia, among others.  We depart from these papers by 
focusing on the overnight interbank market per se. Hence, we do not discuss this more 
general research, except insofar as it is strictly relevant to understanding the overnight 
markets. 
The paper is structured to bring out the main contributions of our survey, given that no such 
survey exists at this time when overnight interbank markets are attracting increasing interest 
                                                           
1 EONIA: Euro Overnight Index Average. 
2 One reason for this is that in many countries overnight interbank market data are not readily available for 
public use. 
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from researchers, policy makers, and practitioners.  In section 2 we set out key institutional 
features of the overnight market focussing on its interaction with central bank reserve 
requirements and intervention policy.  Virtually all overnight lending is unsecured and 
therefore relationships and networking are particularly important in the functioning of the 
market.  In section 3 we discuss the burgeoning literature on interbank networking insofar as 
it concerns the overnight market.  In section 4 we expound the basic theoretical model of the 
overnight rate and summarise recent theoretical developments that study market operations in 
more detail.  In sections 5 and 6 we turn to empirical work on the overnight rate.  Section 5 
reviews the early work, based on the efficient markets approach.  There is abundant evidence 
of apparently predictable movements in overnight interbank rates and in section 6 we examine 
the explanations which have been advanced for these findings.  These focus on the 
institutional structure of bank reserve management facilities and central bank intervention 
which tend to produce various level and volatility effects in the overnight rate.  Section 7 is 
concerned with the 2007-08 financial crisis.  There is an immense literature on this topic and 
here too we focus on issues relevant to the overnight market.  Specifically, it has been argued 
that large-scale asset purchases of central banks (“quantitative easing” or QE) and other 
modifications in operating procedures have fundamentally changed the role of the overnight 
market, and we focus particularly on this issue.  A final section contains some concluding 
remarks, including the main five messages of the paper. 
2. The Institutional Structure of Overnight Interbank Markets 
Interbank markets in general enable banks to manage, pool and redistribute their funds, and so 
provide lending and deposit facilities more efficiently.  It was the freeze-up in interbank 
lending that heralded the onset of the 2007-08 financial crisis (Green, 2011).  The overnight 
market is arguably the most important interbank market.  It plays a key role in the monetary 
and payments system of a country and provides an essential safety valve for banks.  Banks 
that are short of cash to balance their positions at the end of each day can make up the 
shortfall by borrowing from the central bank, or in the overnight interbank market, or some 
combination of the two.  Banks with excess cash reserves later in the day have an immediate 
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outlet for these reserves by lending them to other banks in the overnight market.  Borrowing 
from the central bank is usually regarded as “last resort” borrowing as it generally involves a 
penalty in comparison to borrowing from the market: an above-market interest rate or 
additional non-interest costs, or both.  Therefore, borrowing in the overnight interbank market 
can be seen as “next-to-last resort” borrowing. 
For individual banks, overnight cash shortages or excesses arise either from distributional 
shocks that temporarily transfer liquidity from one bank to another, or from shocks that affect 
aggregate liquidity.  The overnight market provides banks with liquidity insurance, enabling 
them to pool liquidity and settle large or unexpected transactions flows resulting from 
distributional shocks without holding large cash balances for settlement purposes.  Aggregate 
shocks can only be insured by the central bank increasing or decreasing the aggregate supply 
of liquidity (reserves).  In managing the aggregate supply of reserves, central banks face a 
difficult set of conflicts.  Bank reserves are required to finance the payments mechanism but 
are also used to underpin monetary policy.  The funds required for payment purposes 
typically far exceed the quantity consistent with the central bank’s desired interest rate.  
Central banks must allow a high level of reserves for payments purposes during each day, but 
shrink them back to a level consistent with monetary policy objectives at the end of the day.  
The element of liquidity insurance implicit in reserve management operations may create 
moral hazard, and lead to excessive risk-taking by banks. 
The interest rate in the overnight market serves several important purposes.  First, it is often 
used as the main operational target for monetary policy: the Federal funds rate in the US and 
the unsecured call rate in Japan3.  Alternatively, it may act as a key short-term indicator, as 
does the EONIA for The European Central Bank (ECB) and the SONIA for the Bank of 
England (BoE)4.  Pressures on the financial system are reflected rapidly in a shortage or 
excess of bank reserves and corresponding movements in the overnight rate.  Second, as it is 
                                                           
3 From March 2001 the call rate was replaced by a quantitative target for commercial bank reserve balances at 
the Bank of Japan.  See the discussion in section 7. 
4 SONIA (sterling overnight index average) refers to the rate on unsecured loans and RONIA (repo overnight 
index average) refers to that on secured loans (Bank of England, 2012). 
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the shortest maturity interest rate in the financial system it acts as the anchor for the term 
structure of interest rates.  Movements in the overnight rate are often followed by changes in 
longer-term rates.  Third, the overnight rate is the first link in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy.  Policy actions have their first effects in the overnight market, and these 
spread through the financial system and the whole economy.  Understanding the overnight 
interbank rate is therefore of crucial importance for the implementation of monetary policy. 
To balance transactions and policy consideration while ensuring an orderly overnight market, 
central banks typically adhere to a highly structured pattern of activities during the working 
day linked to the operation of the real-time gross settlement system.  See Akhtar (1997) on the 
US Federal Reserve (the Fed); Bank of England (2012, 2014); Bank of Japan (2012); 
Hartmann, Manna and Manzanares (2001) and European Central Bank (2011).  Links 
between the overnight market and the market for bank reserves are determined mainly by 
reserve requirement arrangements (Gray, 2011).  The amount of reserves a bank is required to 
hold is calculated as a given percentage (the reserve requirement ratio) of selected (eligible) 
deposit liabilities in a particular time period: the calculation period.  The calculation period 
may be a single day (Turkey), or the average of eligible liabilities over a period such as a 
fortnight (US) or a month (Japan) preceding that in which the reserves must be held.  The 
holding period for required reserves is called the maintenance period.  This may be daily 
(Kenya until 20115); more usually it is between 14 days (US) and one month (Japan), and 
gives a regular fixed period within which banks have to meet their reserve requirements6 
(O’Brien, 2007).  Unless the reserve test has to be met on a daily basis, a reserve averaging 
procedure is used.  This means that commercial banks must meet the reserve test on the final 
day of the maintenance period (the settlement day) based on the average of reserves over the 
maintenance period7.  Thus, banks know for certain their required minimum reserves only on 
the settlement day.  Reserve averaging serves an important practical purpose: in permitting 
some volatility in the quantity of required reserves over the maintenance period, it helps 
                                                           
5  Central Bank of Kenya, 2011. 
6 The maintenance period in the Eurozone was increased from 4 to 6 weeks effective January 2015 to coincide 
with the contemporaneous increase in the interval between successive meetings of the governing council. 
7 In the US, the weekend accounting convention dictates that Friday’s data count three times in the averaging. 
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prevent excessive volatility in overnight interest rates and central bank intervention rates 
(Gray, 2011). 
The main day-to-day determinants of banks’ reserve demands are the transactions flows 
through the banking system.  Some of these are highly predictable and largely distributive and 
temporary in nature, such as the monthly cycle of wage and salary payments.  Other flows are 
random shocks which may be aggregative or distributive, permanent or temporary, or some 
combination.  Under a reserve averaging system banks can have a shortage or excess of 
reserves during the maintenance period provided the average is satisfied by the end of the 
period.  This enables banks to manage the predictable component of transactions flows 
without excessive recourse to the interbank market or the central bank on a day-to-day basis, 
and so helps to dampen daily and intra-day fluctuations in the overnight rate.  Reserve 
averaging enables the central bank to delegate to commercial banks much of the process of 
reserve management in the face of stochastic shocks; and intervention to inject or drain 
reserves can be carried out smoothly over the maintenance period (Gray, 2011).  The regular 
cycles of reserve calculation and maintenance imply that the demand for reserves will vary 
systematically over the maintenance period.  However, these predictable variations in reserve 
demand should not necessarily create predictable patterns in the overnight rate.  In principle, 
banks should be able to eliminate any predictable patterns through arbitrage during the 
maintenance period (Hamilton, 1996).  We discuss this point in sections 5 and 6. 
The classical interpretation of the relationship between central bank and overnight interest 
rates is traditionally ascribed to Bagehot.  “Bagehot’s rule” was that “…in time of panic it 
[the Bank of England] must advance freely and vigorously to the public out of the reserve. 
[but] … these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest ... [and] these advances 
should be made on all good banking securities … ” (Bagehot 1873, 187-88, cited by 
Grossman and Rockoff, 2015).  If banks are short of reserves and unable to replenish them in 
the overnight market they should be able to borrow from the central bank but with high-grade 
security and at a penalty rate in comparison with market interest rates.  Bagehot was 
concerned with times of crisis.  In normal times the doctrine was generally interpreted to 
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mean that the central bank discount rate should be above the overnight rate.  This was 
consistent with the historic operating procedures of some central banks but not all.  The Fed’s 
discount rate was invariably below the key Federal funds rate from the 1960s until the change 
in operating procedures in January 2003 (Cecchetti, 2009). 
More recently, several central banks have followed the ECB and offered an interest rate 
“corridor” (European Central Bank, 2011).  This is now the normal modus operandi of the 
BoE (Bank of England, 2012); and the de facto operating procedure of the Fed since it began 
paying interest on reserves in October 2008 (Kahn, 2010).  The ECB provides two standing 
facilities for banks (in addition to discount window borrowing) in the form of marginal 
deposit and lending facilities at fixed rates.  The deposit and lending rates form a corridor 
within which the key intervention rates normally lie.  Until the 2007-08 financial crisis, the 
width of the corridor was 200 basis points.  It was reduced successively after the financial 
crisis, as the ECB resisted the introduction of a negative deposit rate.  A negative deposit rate 
was introduced in June 2014, and at this time the corridor was 50 basis points wide.  Other 
central banks operate with corridors of different widths.  The main refinancing operations 
(MROs) of the ECB are carried out at a fixed rate orand a variable rate at which banks tender 
for repurchase agreements (repos) supplied by the ECB8.  The main overnight interbank rate 
(EONIA) generally lies in the corridor set by the standing facilities, but the variable MRO rate 
sometimes strays outside (Välimäki, 2003). 
The overnight market is also influenced by central bank intervention policies.  From the early 
1980’s European central banks increasingly used repos to provide assistance to banks 
(Kneeshaw and van den Bergh, 1989).  In normal times, The ECB and other central banks 
now rely exclusively on repos in open market operations (Bindseil, 2004), although the large-
scale outright asset purchases that followed the financial crisis marked a departure from this 
strategy, and a return to older policy methods.  Repo operations are the normal intervention 
method of choice, as they provide greater flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency for money 
                                                           
8 MROs were implemented using fixed rate tenders from 1999 through June 2000, and from October 2008.  
Variable rate tenders were used in the intervening period. 
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market management, as compared with traditional instruments such as asset purchases and 
discount window borrowing.  First, in a repo auction the central bank determines the maturity 
of the repo, the date of refinancing and the volume of reserves banks can borrow.  Second, 
repos allow a fine-tuning of banks’ refinancing conditions (and thus of money market rates), 
since they mature and are renewed at relatively short intervals.  Announcements of repo 
operations constitute one of the main indicators of central bank intentions in many countries.  
For commercial banks, borrowing reserves in the interbank market is an obvious alternative to 
central bank credit, but these transactions only redistribute central bank money within the 
banking sector.  When the central bank restricts the supply of bank reserves in a repo auction, 
the resulting excess demand for central bank money pushes the overnight rate higher.  Hence 
banks have to borrow their missing reserves at a penalty rate: either at the policy rate or in the 
money market at a higher rate than before the central bank’s intervention (Bindseil, 2004). 
3. Relationships and Networking in Overnight Markets  
The important feature of the overnight interbank market that distinguishes it from markets in 
longer-term loans, and borrowing from the central bank, is that the lending is all unsecured 
(European Central Bank, 2011; Bank of Japan, 2012; US Federal Reserve Board, 2005)9.  
Banks utilise lines of credit with other banks for borrowing and lending, and lenders must 
determine the credit-worthiness of the borrowers to whom they lend.  This means that 
relationship and network effects are important in these markets.  Relationship banking implies 
that institutions with lesser reputations will tend to transact regularly with a consistent and 
relatively limited number of counterparties with whom they have an established relationship.  
This mitigates asymmetric information and may be expected to yield finer rates for 
participating banks (Furfine, 1999, 2000).  Larger banks may be expected to transact more 
widely.  The largest banks may form a core group, transacting extensively with one another 
and with the smaller banks in the system (Imakubo and Soejima, 2010).  In their study of 
Portugal, Cocco, Gomes and Martins (2009) find that banks that have a higher proportion of 
non-performing loans and therefore greater liquidity risk depend more heavily for liquidity 
                                                           
9 Exceptionally, in the UK, there are active markets in secured and unsecured overnight loans.  See footnote 4. 
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insurance on banks with whom they have an established long-term relationship.  They also 
find that interbank relationships are more persistent among domestic banks than between 
domestic and foreign banks.  Affinito (2012) also finds that banking relationships are more 
durable between Italian banks than as between Italian and foreign banks. 
Networking relationships in interbank markets create interdependencies with a potential for 
contagion, especially where, as in the overnight market, there is an absence of collateral: a 
liquidity or solvency problem in one bank can easily spread from one bank to another, 
channelled through the interbank network and triggering multiple bank failures (Freixas, 
Parigi and Rochet, 2000; Iori, Jafarey and Padilla, 2006; Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer and Lentorn, 
2007).  This issue of systemic risk was brought to the fore by the 2007-08 financial crisis in 
which initial problems at certain banks triggered potentially catastrophic losses to the whole 
financial system (Glasserman and Young, 2015).  Following the seminal contribution of Boss, 
Elsinger, Summer and Thurner (2004), network theory has been used to characterise the 
linkages in financial systems and identify possible sources of contagion and systemic risk.  In 
this approach each bank is viewed as a node in a network which is linked to other nodes 
(banks) by the banking relationships represented by the value and terms of borrowing and 
lending transactions.  A complete interbank market structure may be defined as one in which 
every bank has a bilateral relationship (lending and borrowing) with every other bank.  An 
incomplete structure is one in which banks have relationships with a limited number of other 
banks.  Early research suggested that a complete structure is inherently less vulnerable to 
contagion than one which is incomplete, especially if an incomplete structure involves a series 
of one-way relationships (borrowing or lending) effectively forming a one-way “chain of 
contagion” (Allen and Gale, 2000).   
Early research on interbank networks focussed on network topology; that is, the linkages 
among banks, instead of on the characteristics of the banks themselves.  Craig and von Peter 
(2014) argue that banking networks do not arise randomly as a result of outside forces but 
emerge endogenously because of the nature of individual banks, especially differences in size 
and reputation that tend to produce networks in which relationships are tiered in a “core-
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periphery” structure, with a limited number of money centre banks transacting with each other 
and with smaller banks; meanwhile, smaller banks transact mainly with a relatively few large 
banks.  Interbank networks are relatively concentrated, with a high proportion of transactions 
by number and size being placed by a relatively small number of banks, such as in the Federal 
funds market (Furfine, 1999) and the Japanese call market (Imakubo and Soejima, 2010). 
Even so, there remains disagreement in theory and in practise about the optimal structure of a 
financial network, especially in being robust in the face of shocks such as the 2007-08 
financial crisis.  The argument that a complete structure is more robust than one which is 
incomplete (Allen and Gale, 2000), depends in part on the magnitude of the shocks to which 
the system is subject as well as the characteristics of the banks at each node and their lending 
and borrowing relationships.  If a negative shock is sufficiently large, financial systems which 
are less strongly interconnected may be less vulnerable to collapse because larger institutions 
can act as a buffer against the propagation of the shock to smaller or weaker institutions 
(Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015).  Networks that have a core-periphery 
structure tend to be more robust the stronger are the core banks, but also the more similar in 
size and structure are these banks, as they provide a collective defence against systemic risk 
(Glasserman and Young, 2015).  In general therefore, systems which are overly complex and 
“too interconnected” may be more vulnerable to collapse (Gai, Haldane and Kapadia, 2011). 
In terms of the empirical evidence, Fricke and Lux (2015) identify that Italian banks are 
formed into a core-periphery structure that has been relatively persistent over time and as 
among banks.  The interbank network is relatively incomplete with core banks trading with 
each other and with at least one non-core bank, but sometimes no more than one.  They 
conjecture that core banks have a comparative advantage in gathering and distributing 
information, because of economies of scale in information processing.  Parallel results are 
obtained by Affinito (2012) who investigates the persistence of banking relationships in Italy 
during the 2007-08 financial crisis.  He also finds that the relationships between lending and 
borrowing banks remained durable through the financial crisis even as borrowing banks 
experienced temporary liquidity problems.  A less intuitive structure is identified in Kenya’s 
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interbank market (Oduor, Sichei, Tiriongo and Shimba, 2014), where the strongest network 
relationships are those among smaller banks and much less as between large and small banks. 
Studies of the UK by Wells (2004), of the Netherlands by Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006), and 
of Italy by Mistrulli (2011) broadly confirm that risk of systemic failure depends on the exact 
structure of the interbank network.  A single bank failure is rarely sufficient to trigger the 
failure of other banks, but it can weaken substantially the capital holdings of the banking 
system.  The severity of contagion depends on the linkages in the interbank market (Wells, 
2004), and on the size and centrality of the initial failing bank (Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006): 
the larger and more central the initial failure, the more likely it is that there will be contagion.  
Evidence from Mexico confirms that financial fragility also depends on the characteristics of 
individual banks as well as the network itself.  The system becomes more fragile when: there 
are more overexposed banks; there are more paths in the network going through overexposed 
banks; and negative shocks fall more heavily on “core” banks (Martinez-Jaramillo, Perez 
Perez, Avila Embriz and Lopez Gallo Dey, 2010). 
However in Switzerland, Sheldon and Maurer (2004) found that although the probability of a 
single bank failure was relatively high, the risk of it contaminating the whole system through 
the interbank market was much lower.  A similar study of German banks by Upper and 
Worms (2004) also argued that the probability of contagion was relatively low but identified 
smaller banks as being the most vulnerable to failure, although the mechanism for contagion 
works through the larger banks.  In contrast, Muller (2006) uses graph theory to describe a 
“hub and spoke” structure in the Swiss interbank market where the two major banks are 
involved in a high proportion of all the transactions with other institutions.  She identifies 
systemically important banks using 5 key characteristics: they have exposures and liabilities 
to many other banks; they have large interbank exposures; their failure would weaken 
numerous banks; their counterparties are also important banks; and they lie on numerous 
potential paths for contagion (Muller, 2006).  On this basis Muller argued that the Swiss 
banking system was very vulnerable to contagion because of the centrality of the two main 
banks.  A similar structure is reported for Colombia by León, Machado and Murcia (2014).  
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They investigate linkages across the whole financial system including banks and non-banks.  
They find that banks are systemically more important than non-banks and, like Switzerland, 
just two banks stand at the apex of the money market, rendering it potentially vulnerable to 
contagion in a similar way.  Mistrulli (2011) argues that the maximum entropy approach used 
by these authors tends to overstate the risks of contagion in incomplete networks.  In a study 
of Italy he finds that there are several buffers limiting contagion, especially if bank holding 
companies are allowed to recapitalise failing affiliates in a crisis.  In these circumstances, it 
would seem that size does matter. 
Networking in the interbank market is not only pivotal for liquidity management it can also 
provide monitoring tools that could counterbalance some of the risks of contagion.  Rochet 
and Tirole (1996) argue that interbank relationships provide incentives for banks to monitor 
each other.  If lending banks believe that they are exposed to potential losses on unsecured 
loans, they will monitor borrowing banks, and we would expect banks to be particularly good 
at identifying the risk of other banks.  This is a form of market discipline that could 
supplement formal bank regulation and supervision.  Banks who participate in the interbank 
market must have a high degree of transparency and disclosure, to transmit information and 
reduce uncertainty for lenders and borrowers.  They may also maintain a higher level of 
reserves than non-participants so as to reduce liquidity risks.  In the Federal funds market, 
Furfine (2001b) found that banks with higher profitability, fewer problem loans and higher 
capital ratios do indeed pay lower interest rates for borrowing.  Likewise, more risky banks 
tend to borrow less than others (King, 2008).  Comparable results are obtained for German 
banks in a dataset that includes the run-up to and aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crisis 
(Bräuning and Fecht, 2012).  However, Dinger and Von Hagen (2009) argue that these studies 
only screen borrowing banks’ prior risk before the loan rather than lending banks’ monitoring 
after the loan.  They suggest that the weak evidence of market discipline may be attributable 
to a focus on highly developed banking markets, where interbank exposures can be quickly 
abandoned by both counterparties.  Using data on smaller banks in Central and Eastern 
12 
 
European countries, they find that banks with greater long-term exposure to the interbank 
markets are those with lower risks in their loan portfolios. 
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4.  Theories of Reserve Management 
We now consider theories of reserve management and the determination of the overnight 
interest rate.  Theory largely focusses on a single market interest rate, although on any given 
day, there are many overnight rates, corresponding to loans made at different times in the day.  
In empirical time-series work, the daily interbank rate is usually calculated as a single value-
weighted average of rates on every transaction on that day.  This minimises the impact of 
intraday variations in market liquidity.  Several papers do consider the relationships between 
the time series and cross-sectional pattern of rates, and we refer to these as necessary. 
The basic theory of the overnight market utilises the stochastic reserve management model of 
Poole (1968) and Baltensperger (1972, 1980)10.  We summarise this model before considering 
more recent developments.  The model considers the process by which an individual bank 
manages stochastic net flows of deposits associated with the daily clearing.  It decides each 
day how much to lend to its customers before it knows the outcome of the deposit flows.  If 
the net inflow of deposits exceeds lending, the bank accumulates excess reserves and suffers a 
penalty because the return on reserves is less than the return on loans.  If deposit inflows are 
too low, the bank borrows from the central bank, and incurs a penalty: first, because the cost 
of discount window borrowing may be higher than the market rate and second, because there 
may be non-interest costs of discount window borrowing.  Since the net flows at clearing are 
not known until the end of the day, a bank will invariably find itself with excess or deficient 
cash at this time.  There is also a range of issues associated with reserve requirements as 
discussed in section 2.  Here we assume that the reserve test must be met daily; and the level 
of required reserves is set to zero without loss of generality.  In this model there is no 
interbank market; we introduce it explicitly below.  Thus we define: 
   a = the day’s flow of loans; with a > 0 
   e = flow of cash; with e ≥ 0 
   c = borrowing from the central bank; with c ≥ 0  
                                                           
10  An alternative is the state-preference liquidity trading model of Allen and Gale (2004). 
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   ra = the return on loans 
   re = the return on reserves (initially we assume re = 0) 
   ic = the interest cost of borrowing from the central bank (discount rate) 
 γ = the non-interest (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) cost of borrowing from the central bank 
which we assume to be a fixed penalty irrespective of the amount borrowed. 
The net flow of deposits (in or out) is governed by a random variable: b ( ≷ 0):. 
  φ(b) refers to the probability distribution governing deposit flows, and:  
 ∫ ∞−=Φ
λ
ϕλ dbb)()(  is the cumulative probability that b ≤< λ. 
The cost of deposits is assumed to be negligible. 
The bank’s daily sources-uses statement is given by: 
a + e = b + c                                                         …(1) 
Banks are risk-neutral with expected profits on any particular day given by: 
∫∫ ∞−∞− −−−=Π
a
c
a
ca dbbidbbbaiarE )()()(  ϕγϕ                                   …(2) 
The first term in (2) is loan revenue decided by the bank given the loan rate.  If b > a, excess 
reserves are e = b – a, and earn no interest.  If b < a, the bank must borrow c = a – b at an 
interest cost of ic per £ and a fixed cost = γ for a loan of any size.  A convenient normalisation 
is to scale the fixed cost to the exogenous central bank interest rate (ic). 
Differentiating (2) with respect to a gives: 
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cca ϕγ                                              …(3) 
or:  )(  )(  / aair ca γϕ+Φ=                                                   …(4a) 
In the special case where γ = 0, we have:       1 )(  / <Φ= air ca                   …(4b) 
Without a fixed penalty (γ = 0), we get the well-known result (4b), due to Poole (1968): the 
probability of having to borrow from the central bank is set equal to the ratio of the average 
lending rate to the average borrowing rate (the central bank discount rate).  This implies that 
the central bank discount rate must exceed a bank’s average lending rate, and is likely to do so 
15 
 
by a considerable margin (Clouse and Dow, 1999).  If the discount rate were not a penalty 
rate, banks would have an incentive to borrow unlimited amounts from the central bank. 
If there are non-interest costs of borrowing from the central bank (γ ≠ 0), the discount rate can 
be below market rates.  Non-interest costs may be divided into three.  First, borrowing from 
the central bank is less flexible than borrowing from the market: the period of the loan is set 
by the central bank.  Second, borrowing from the central bank is secured, and collateralisation 
is itself costly.  Third, there may be a “stigma” of borrowing from the central bank which 
discourages banks from borrowing as frequently or as much as they wish (Furﬁne, 2001a).  
Non-interest costs may include variable and fixed elements.  Clouse and Dow (1999) pointed 
out that the existence of fixed costs of borrowing from the central bank is sufficient to 
produce a more realistic (smaller) differential between ic and ra, depending inter alia on ic and 
γ (4a)11.  The discount window is more costly for smaller banks than for larger banks because 
smaller banks cannot spread the fixed costs over such a large loan as can bigger banks.  This 
suggests that larger banks will self-select to be regular borrowers from the central bank to 
benefit from the economies of scale.  This frees up the cash supplied by the central bank for 
smaller banks to hold positive excess reserves, avoiding recourse to the discount window.  
This argument offers an explanation for a smaller penalty (ic – ra) and the common 
observation that the predominant users of the discount window are larger banks.  It is also 
consistent with the general pattern of interbank market transactions in which smaller banks 
tend to lend excess reserves to larger banks: in the US (Allen, Peristiani and Saunders, 1989), 
Italy (Affinito, 2012) and elsewhere.  A further argument, put forward in the euro zone, is that 
certain banks have a comparative advantage in collateralising debt, because they have higher-
quality liquid assets and lower costs of collateralisation.  These banks borrow from the central 
bank and lend to other banks with higher collateralisation costs (Neyer and Wiemers, 2004).  
To study the interbank market and a central bank interest rate corridor, the basic model is 
usually amended by assuming that banks borrow or lend deterministically in the interbank 
                                                           
11 From (4a), ic > ra if 1 > Φ(a) + γicφ(a) > Φ(a); which is true if: 1 – Φ(a) > γicφ(a) > 0.  The right-hand 
inequality is true; and the left-hand inequality holds for plausible values of ic, normalising γ at unity. 
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market and then, following revelation of deposit flows, either lend to or borrow from central 
bank standing facilities at a penalty rate in either direction.  To focus on the corridor, we set 
loans (a) to zero, and introduce borrowing and lending in the interbank market as: 
      h = interbank lending; with h ≥ 0;    m = interbank borrowing; with m ≥ 0  
and:   rh = the return on interbank loans;    im = the cost of interbank borrowing 
In equilibrium rh = im.  However, the usual development of this model (Välimäki, 2003) 
begins with an individual bank which exogenously decides to lend (for example) in the 
interbank market, discovers its deposit flows and then uses the standing facility.  If h < b, the 
bank is a depositor with the central bank (e + h = b); if h > b, the bank borrows from the 
standing facility (h = b + c).  The day’s expected profit of any lending bank is given by: 
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Φ(h) is the probability that the bank must borrow from the standing facility (b < h).  Therefore: 
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is the supply of interbank loans.  The lower the interbank rate the less is the supply of loans. 
If γ = 0, (7) states that the interbank (lending) rate is an average of the rates on the two 
standing facilities and lies within the interest rate corridor.  This is not an equilibrium as it 
refers only to banks who are lending in the interbank market.  Other banks exogenously 
decide to borrow.  Their optimisation problem determines the demand for interbank loans (m: 
m > 0; h = 0) in a similar form to (9).  For these banks, the lower the interbank rate, the 
greater is their demand for loans.  The equilibrium interbank rate is found by setting h = m 
and rh = rm.  A closed-form solution is available only for specific probability distributions 
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which we do not pursue here12.  Where there are fixed costs of borrowing from the standing 
facility (γ ≠ 0), the supply of loans in the interbank market is reduced as this reduces the risk 
of borrowing from the standing facility.  However, the demand for interbank loans increases, 
to reduce the probability of borrowing from the central bank.  Thus, a higher fixed penalty 
tends to increase the equilibrium interbank rate, relative to the discount rate.  The relationship 
between the interbank rate and the corridor (ic – re) depends on interest and non-interest costs.  
However, it is clear from (8) that the narrower is the corridor the higher is the probability of 
utilising the standing facility.  In general, Bindseil and Jabłecki (2011) show that a narrower 
corridor will be associated with: greater commercial bank recourse to the central bank, less 
use of the overnight market and less interest rate volatility within the corridor. 
The basic model has been extended in many ways, notably to incorporate greater institutional 
detail about the interbank market and central bank policy, especially the maintenance period 
(Perez Quiros and Rodriguez Mendizabal, 2006) and repo auctions (Ayuso and Repullo. 2003; 
Välimäki, 2003).  A key issue is to understand what determines the allocation of banks’ 
transactions between the interbank market and the central bank.  If banks are risk-neutral13, 
diversification can only occur if the different sources of borrowing and lending are subject to 
increasing costs.  Otherwise, the overnight rate would converge to the discount rate, as banks 
transacted exclusively in the lowest-cost market (Bucher, Hauck and Neyer, 2014).  Therefore, 
to understand why banks may limit their transactions with the interbank market or the central 
bank we need to consider the relative costs of operating in the different markets. 
Neyer and Wiemers (2004) argue that banks do face increasing (interest and non-interest) 
costs in the interbank market.  Consider first borrowing in the interbank market.  Since this is 
unsecured, it typically involves the use of lines of credit.  If a bank has to borrow more, it will 
incur transactions and search costs if it uses more different lines of credit.  Splitting larger 
transactions into smaller ones to utilise existing lines of credit is also likely to prove costly 
(Bucher et. al., 2014).  Alternatively, it will face congestion costs if it uses fewer lines of 
                                                           
12 See Neyer and Wiemers (2004) for an example with the uniform distribution. 
13 This is a standard assumption.  An exception is Ho and Saunders (1985) who assume risk-averse banks. 
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credit, as it is likely to encounter increasing borrowing costs (Neyer, 2004).  Larger borrowers 
may incur increased asset monitoring or recall costs, such as early sales of bills on the 
following day.  Some banks may limit their exposure to interbank trading for capital adequacy 
reasons (Välimäki, 2006).  Linzert and Schmidt (2011) argue that banks may be less willing 
to lend money in unsecured interbank trading at times of greater aggregate uncertainty. 
Banks are also likely to face increasing costs of borrowing from the central bank.  First, 
discount window borrowing is secured and therefore involves a collateralisation cost.  
Collateralisation ties up liquid assets that could have been available for outright sale and may 
constrain the asset choices of banks who believe they may have to be discount window 
borrowers later in the day (Neyer, 2004).  Collateralisation costs are likely to include a fixed 
and a variable element, especially because the form of acceptable collateral will vary across 
lenders (Välimäki, 2006).  Second are the costs of participation in the central bank repo 
auction.  A common format is the fixed-liquidity, variable-price auction: banks that want to 
borrow more face increasing costs otherwise they may be outbid in the auction (Wurtz, 2003; 
Nautz and Offermanns, 2007).  Third, borrowing from (and lending to) the central bank, 
whether through the discount window or repos is typically for a fixed period. 
Lenders face symmetric costs to borrowers: transaction, search, congestion and monitoring 
costs of lending larger amounts and to more different borrowers.  Although lenders may 
charge higher interest rates to large borrowers they may also face a higher risk of default or 
rollover.  There are similar costs on the lending side of the central bank repo market.  A fixed-
liquidity, flexible-price auction of reverse repos will only mop up the liquidity of a bank if it 
bids high enough (lower interest rate) to maximise its chance of success, and the larger its 
excess liquidity, the higher must be its bid ceteris paribus. 
Incorporating these factors into a more comprehensive model of the interbank market yields 
several conclusions regarding the determinants of the overnight rate14.  First, the overnight 
rate will adjust as central bank rates are changed by the authorities, although the adjustment is 
                                                           
14 The following discussion summarises results established, inter alia, in: Neyer and Wiemers (2004); Välimäki 
(2003); and Afonso and Lagos (2015).  
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not necessarily one-for-one.  The rate will not always lie within the central bank’s interest rate 
corridor, but may be above the borrowing rate.  This depends on the relationship between the 
full costs of borrowing in the interbank market as against those of borrowing from the central 
bank.  Second therefore, costs of operating in interbank and other markets directly affect both 
the average level of the interbank rate and the daily cross-sectional distribution of rates.  Third, 
other central bank operating tools such as the structure and size of the repo auction and 
reserve requirements will affect the interbank rate.  Fourth, aggregate and distributional 
liquidity shocks affect the level and distribution of rates.  An aggregate (negative) liquidity 
shock tends to raise the interbank rate, and increase its volatility, and may also increase 
market volume.  The effects of distributional shocks are less clear.  An increase in the cross-
sectional dispersion of deposit flows tends to increase the rate interbank lenders will demand 
but reduce the rate that borrowers will pay.  Lenders demand a higher rate because increased 
dispersion increases the quantity risk of lending, and therefore the price risk because of 
increasing costs.  Since the quantity and price risk of borrowing are also higher borrowers 
would prefer a lower rate.  The impact on the interbank rate depends on the relative strength 
of these two effects and cannot necessarily be determined a priori. 
In theory therefore, the overnight interbank rate is determined by a range of factors including: 
other interest rates, the costs for banks of operating in the market, central bank operations and 
discount policy, and shocks to bank liquidity which must be settled by the close of business.  
Many of these factors are determined partly by the institutional framework, including the 
interbank network and relationships.  Overall though, we would expect to find strong linkages 
between the interbank rate and other short-term interest rates, especially the central bank’s 
rates which are the immediate alternative sources of overnight cash for a commercial bank. 
5.  Empirical Studies: The Martingale Hypothesis and Monetary Policy 
The modern empirical literature on the overnight rate was initiated by Shiller, Campbell and 
Schoenholtz (1983) and Hamilton (1996), who tested the martingale hypothesis for the US 
Federal funds rate.  Demand for reserves varies systematically over time because of the 
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regular cycles of reserve computation and maintenance.  If banks face an average reserve 
requirement, reserves on any one day are perfect substitutes for reserves on any other day 
within the maintenance period.  Therefore, predictable variations in reserve demand should 
not create predictable patterns in the (overnight) Federal funds rate within each maintenance 
period.  Banks can arbitrage away expected differences between the current and future cost of 
funds by selling reserves on “high” rate days and buying them on “low” rate days, while still 
meeting the reserve requirements on settlement day.  This argument does not apply to the 
settlement day itself since reserves are not perfect substitutes across maintenance periods. 
Shiller et al (1983) found that the Federal funds rate did not follow a martingale.  Hamilton 
(1996) proposed a more complete empirical model of the daily funds rate, simultaneously 
modelling the conditional mean and variance using a regime-switching EGARCH model: 
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Here, it is the Federal funds rate, with conditional mean given by (10); and Xt is a vector of 
dummy variables for calendar and end-of-reserve-period effects which may affect martingale 
behaviour.  The error process (εt) is a mixture of normal distributions (11) to control for the 
occurrence of irregular outliers.  The EGARCH process (12) is used to model the observed 
persistence in the conditional variance; Vt is a vector of dummies.  Hamilton (1996) 
concluded like Shiller et al. (1983) that the daily Federal funds rate did not follow a 
martingale even within the maintenance period.  He found a strong predictable pattern of day-
of-the-week and other calendar effects 15 , including predictable market tightening on 
settlement days when overnight rates tended to be systematically higher than at other times in 
the maintenance period.   
                                                           
15 These included pre- and post-holiday, end-quarter and end-year effects. 
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In a study of the G7 and euro zone countries, Prati, Bartolini and Bertola (2003) investigated 
the robustness of these findings using a similar EGARCH model to represent the systematic 
time-variation in the variance which is characteristic of overnight market rates in general.  
Following Hamilton (1996), the conditional mean and variance are explained by (predictable) 
dummy variables.  They verified the non-martingale property of the overnight rate, but found 
that its behaviour varied considerably across countries.  Market tightness on settlement days 
appeared to be peculiar to the US and was not evident in other G7 countries (except Germany).  
However, higher overnight rate volatility on settlement days was a common feature of the G7, 
but more detailed comparisons suggested that the time series patterns of the conditional mean 
and variance of the overnight rate were closely related to specific features of each country’s 
central bank operating and intervention procedures in the market for reserves. 
Perez Quiros and Rodriguez Mendizabal (2006) also used an EGARCH model to test the 
martingale hypothesis for German and European overnight rates, with results that are broadly 
consistent with Prati, et al. (2003).  There were strong daily effects in the overnight rate in 
Germany prior to European Monetary Union (EMU), quite similar to those in the Federal 
funds rate, but many of these effects appear weaker or different in nature following EMU16.  
The authors speculate that this may be due to the changes in monetary arrangements after 
EMU, and to differences between US and European arrangements: a longer maintenance 
period in the euro zone, and the existence of standing deposit and lending facilities.  Perez 
Quiros and Rodriguez Mendizabal (2006) argue that there are good reasons why bank 
reserves in the euro zone are not perfect inter-temporal substitutes within the maintenance 
period, even if banks expect rates to be constant.  This is because of the asymmetry between 
reserves and borrowings.  As a bank accumulates reserves in any maintenance period, this 
increases the likelihood that it will find itself with excess reserves.  Once a bank has 
accumulated its required reserves, it is effectively locked-in to this state as reserve holdings 
are strictly non-negative.  Therefore banks will prefer to be short of reserves in the early part 
of the maintenance period, and this creates a profile of increasing demand for reserves as the 
                                                           
16 After EMU, the variable to be explained is the EONIA rate, except that on the first day of each reserve 
maintenance period the EONIA is replaced by the spread between EONIA and the rate on the MROs. 
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period progresses.  This implies a systematic upward trend in the overnight rate as settlement 
day approaches and banks seek reserves.  They also argue that deviations from a martingale 
will be reduced as the width of the central bank’s interest rate corridor decreases.  Perez 
Quiros and Rodriguez Mendizabal (2006) show that overnight rates in Germany did tend to 
rise towards the end of the maintenance period, but following EMU, EONIA rates tended to 
decline as settlement day approached.  They attribute the change, in part, to the introduction 
of the standing deposit facility following EMU.  However, Fecht, Nyborg and Rocholl (2008) 
argue that higher rates at the beginning of the maintenance period may be driven by a 
temporary shortage of liquidity at this time.  Indeed, there is evidence that the ECB tended to 
over-allot reserves towards the end of the maintenance period (Nautz and Offermanns, 2007). 
If the overnight rate is not a martingale, it could be because of anticipations of or reactions to 
central bank policy decisions.  In the euro zone, the interest rate on the ECB’s MROs and the 
overnight rate both play pivotal roles in ECB operations aimed at steering interest rates.  As 
the ECB does not have an official operating target for any interbank rate, the MROs ensure 
equilibrium by satisfying demands for central bank balances in a smooth fashion over the 
course of each maintenance period (Manna, Pill and Quiros, 2001).  In the absence of 
liquidity shocks or new information, market expectations about the ECB’s interest rates 
should be reflected in overnight rates at the beginning of the maintenance period.  
Expectations about overnight rates within the period should affect spot overnight rates from 
the beginning of the maintenance period.  If the market can forecast ECB moves then the 
behaviour of overnight rates within the maintenance period should not be significantly 
affected by monetary policy announcements following ECB Governing Council meetings.  
Gaspar, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2001) looked at whether ECB interest rate announcements 
influenced the stochastic behaviour of overnight rates using the regime-switching EGARCH 
model of Hamilton (1996) and Perez Quiros et al.  and Rodriguez Mendizabal (2006)17; and 
found that the announcements did not affect either the level or variability of overnight money 
market interest rates. 
                                                           
17 The issue of how well markets can anticipate the Fed’s monetary policy moves has been investigated using 
Fed funds futures prices (Krueger and Kuttner, 1996). 
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Subsequent literature has built on this framework, using GARCH-class models to analyse the 
volatility of overnight rates.  Empirical research has focussed on the reserve maintenance 
period, central bank operations, as well as the impact of liquidity and payments shocks. 
6. Reserves Management and Central Bank Operations 
The foregoing arguments suggest that, with reserve averaging, the reserve management 
process may create predictable variations in the interbank rate.  Bank reserves management is 
closely related to the settlement system, since reserves are required to meet the daily payment 
needs of banks’ customers.  Furfine (2000) developed and tested a model of US bank reserve 
management and the Federal funds market that explicitly incorporates interbank payments 
and settlement.  The model does not rely on the transactions costs and market frictions that 
are central to Hamilton’s (1996) explanation for the predictable pattern of overnight rates.  
Instead, it is built on the assumption that each bank cannot know for certain its final reserve 
balance before transacting in the funds market.  Furfine (2000) argues that the predictable 
pattern in the overnight rate is associated with the lack of a deep funds market late in the day.  
Banks face uncertainty about their end-of-day reserves which is increasing in the volume of 
their payment obligations.  Banks cannot transact in the funds market to a sufficient degree to 
certainly avoid failing the reserve requirement test or running an overnight overdraft.  
Increased uncertainty generates an increased precautionary demand for reserves: days with 
higher payment flows are associated with increased demand for reserves and upward pressure 
on the funds rate.  These predictable movements in the funds rate are not eliminated by 
arbitrage because penalties for overnight overdrafts limit banks’ ability to smooth reserve 
shocks over time.  Furfine (2000) estimated the model with a panel of depository institutions 
covering 1993 to 1997, and found that reserve uncertainty did increase significantly with 
payments volume.  Simulating the model with the estimated parameter values showed that it 
could reproduce observed daily patterns in the level and volatility of the Federal funds rate.  
In related work, Gaspar, Perez Quiros and Rodrıguez Mendizabal (2008) investigated the 
relationships between the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of euro zone money market 
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transactions and overnight rates.  They studied the determinants of equilibrium in the market 
for daily funds using the EONIA panel database including information on transactions volume 
and lending rates for 64 banks from 1999 to 2002.  Their results show that the time-series 
volatility and cross-section dispersion of rates, the volume of trade and the use of standing 
facilities all increase towards the end of the maintenance period.  They argue that this is 
consistent with a decline in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks during the reserve 
maintenance period.  Thus the results support the argument of Perez Quiros and Rodrıguez 
Mendizabal (2006) that the operational framework of monetary policy tends to induce a 
structural shortage of overnight funds towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. 
Reserve requirements can affect the volatility of the overnight rate in two main ways (Wrase, 
1998).  First, banks use their accounts at the central bank for two distinct purposes: to hold 
reserves, and to settle payments with other banks.  If banks minimise their reserves, they 
might become insufficient to settle payments, and create large swings in the overnight rate in 
response to liquidity shocks.  Second, low reserve holdings hamper the central bank’s 
liquidity management, because banks’ demand for reserves to settle payments is more 
variable than their demand to meet reserve requirements.  Therefore, higher reserve holdings 
provide a liquidity buffer which facilitates banks’ reserve management and the central bank’s 
supply of reserves (Nautz and Schmidt, 2009).  Fecht et al. (2008) studied the time patterns of 
euro zone banks’ “reserve fulfilment ratios”18.  They identified a general liquidity deficit at 
the beginning of the reserve maintenance period, when EONIA rates and hence the cost of 
liquidity tend to be higher.  In contrast to other euro zone banks, German Landesbanks back-
load the fulfilment of their reserve requirements over the reserve maintenance period and 
thereby benefit from the general pattern in the EONIA.  Since the Landesbanks are the 
primary vehicles for collecting German savings, they typically enjoy greater liquidity and less 
uncertainty about reserves later in the maintenance period.  These results underline the point 
that there is an interaction between reserve requirements and the structure of payments and 
                                                           
18 The reserve fulfilment ratio on any given day is defined as the ratio of a bank’s cumulative actual reserves up 
to that day (from the beginning of the maintenance period) to its cumulative required reserves up to the same 
day. 
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settlement, so that the pattern of predictable variations in the overnight rate will tend to be 
different in different institutional settings.  
Central bank intervention also affects the demand for reserves.  Nautz (1998) uses an ARCH-
M model to investigate German Bundesbank operations prior to EMU, and obtains two key 
results.  First, when money market management is based on inflexible standing facilities for 
central bank credit, uncertainty about future refinancing has no impact on the overnight rate.  
Second, in a flexible repo-based money market management scheme, increased uncertainty 
about future refinancing reduces banks’ demand for borrowed reserves and therefore reduces 
the interbank money market rate.  Banks increase their reserves if refinancing is expected to 
be more expensive and if future refinancing conditions become more uncertain. 
Following Nautz (1998), several authors have investigated the impact of central bank 
intervention, for example, Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2002).  However, these papers focus 
on particular characteristics of the local money market.  Bartolini and Prati (2006) present a 
unified framework that allows for rationed provision of liquidity as market rates depart from 
the central bank target and approach the marginal rates on borrowing or lending facilities.  
Their model captures the main cross-country differences along a key dimension of policy 
execution: a central bank’s willingness to offset high-frequency liquidity shocks by injecting 
or draining liquidity into and from the market, at both intra-marginal and marginal liquidity-
management facilities.  Bartolini and Prati (2006) analyse the volatility of overnight rates for 
the seven largest industrial countries and a set of countries in the euro zone.  They allow for 
the effects of reserve requirements and calendar time on the mean and conditional variance of 
interest rates, and for differences in the behaviour of overnight rates as between the last day of 
the maintenance period and other days.  The overnight rate (it) is given by: 
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Here, µt is the conditional mean of it, vt is a zero-mean, unit-variance i.i.d. error and σt is the 
conditional EGARCH volatility parameter.  Central banks can control liquidity by combining 
intra-marginal draining and injection of funds through repos, with marginal draining of funds 
at the floor (rFt) or injection at the ceiling (r
C
t), of the corridor for market rates around a key 
target rate (r*t).  To study the volatility impact of these regimes, Bartolini and Prati (2006) 
control for the effects of official rates by including changes in rF, r* and rC as determinants of 
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includes the position of the overnight rate in its target corridor (ht), and that of the exchange 
rate (xt) in its corridor.  They include the usual calendar dummies in the mean (δct) and 
variance (ξct) equations as well as dummies for each day of the reserve period (δdt and ξdt).  
The empirical results provide broad support for earlier work such as Hamilton (1996) and 
Bartolini et al. (2002), Prati et al. (2003) and Gaspar et al. (2008).  In all countries relying on 
reserve averaging, overnight rates on settlement days are more volatile than on other days; 
and higher volatility on settlement day tends to propagate to the immediately preceding days. 
Nautz and Schmidt (2009) argue that these models19 fail to consider the effects of changes in 
the policy rate, including central bank communication policy, and the level of required 
reserves.  They investigate how US monetary policy affects the dynamics and volatility of the 
Federal funds rate (it).  The conditional mean equation is specified as an ECM: 
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The funds rate adjusts to the policy spread between the funds rate and its target (i – i*); and 
the term spread between three-month bills and the funds rate (i3 – i).  Dummy variables (Di) 
are included to model changes in the monetary policy implementation regime and the usual 
calendar effects.  The variance process is given by a standard EGARCH model which 
includes the volatility impact: of i*; the reserve ratio and the reserve requirement system; and 
the same policy and calendar dummies as in the ECM.  The results show that greater 
                                                           
19 Especially, Bartolini and Prati (2006) and Perez Quiros and Rodrguez Mendizabal (2006). 
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transparency by the Fed did contribute to stabilizing the funds rate.  The volatility of the funds 
rate varies inversely with the level of required reserves suggesting that reserve balances at the 
Fed do tend to facilitate the settlement of payments in the interbank market.  This also 
suggests that the payment of interest on required reserves reduces the volatility of the Federal 
funds rate by broadening the reserve base. 
Nautz and Offermanns (2007) investigate the impact of the ECB’s policy rate and the term 
spread (the EONIA-euribor differential20) on euro zone EONIA dynamics from 1999 to 2004.  
Depending on the repo auction format, the policy rate is defined as the repo rate or the 
minimum bid rate set by the ECB in its weekly MRO tenders.  End-of-maintenance-period 
effects in the EONIA are often related to banks’ bidding behaviour in the MROs.  Banks have 
an incentive to underbid when they expect a cut in interest rates within the maintenance 
period.  Lack of reserves may then force banks to use the ECB’s marginal lending facility 
increasing the EONIA towards the end of the maintenance period.  Thus, interest rates may 
increase although underbidding has occurred, because banks expected interest rates to 
decrease.  During the fixed rate tender period, expectations of a rate increase may lead banks 
to overbid (Välimäki, 2006).  To reduce overbidding, the ECB regularly over-allotted reserves 
in the MROs; but then, contrary to banks’ expectations, the EONIA fell at the end of the 
reserve period.  The model is an ECM in which the EONIA adjusts to the policy spread 
(EONIA – the policy rate) and the EONIA-euribor (term) spread, with dummies to allow for 
different adjustment dynamics during the reserve period.  It also allows for asymmetries in the 
adjustment process, including conditioning on the MRO auction format and for differences 
between within-reserve period adjustments and end-period adjustments. 
The results show that towards the end of the maintenance period, the influence of the policy 
rate on EONIA becomes weaker after the last MRO when reserve requirements have to be 
met without further access to central bank refinancing at the policy rate.  For the term spread, 
the difference in adjustment for within-maintenance-period and end-of-period days is even 
more pronounced.  From June 2000, the link between the EONIA and the ECB’s policy rate 
                                                           
20 Euribor is the three-month money market rate. 
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strengthened when the policy spread increased.  For both auction formats, within the reserve 
period, the adjustment of the EONIA is stronger when the policy spread is below average than 
when it is above average.  However, the asymmetries in the adjustment process are 
independent of the MRO auction procedure.  This is consistent with the findings of Ayuso and 
Repullo (2003).  Likewise, there is no evidence of asymmetric adjustment of the EONIA at 
the end of the reserve period, irrespective of the auction procedure.  Nautz and Offermanns 
(2007) suggest that the weak influence of the policy rate on the EONIA at the end of the 
reserve period may reflect the market’s reaction to banks’ over- and underbidding behaviour 
in the ECB’s MROs. 
The research discussed so far considers only the determinants of the conditional mean and 
volatility of the interbank rate.  Finally, we note briefly the possible inter-linkages between 
the overnight and other rates.  Sarno and Thornton (2003) estimated a non-linear VECM for 
the US Federal funds rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate and found that the 
adjustment of the overnight rate to the Treasury bill rate was asymmetric with negative 
deviations being corrected more quickly than positive deviations.  The burden of adjustment 
was borne mainly by the Federal funds rate, underlining the need to consider the dynamics of 
other rates in the determination of the overnight rate.  Kuo and Enders (2004) and Clarida, 
Sarno, Taylor and Valente (2006) suggest that asymmetric error-correction is also present in 
the Japanese and German term structure of interest rates.  However, these papers do not 
consider the impact of the central bank’s policy rate on the dynamics of the overnight rate. 
7  The Financial Crisis and the Overnight Market 
The crisis of 2007-08 largely affected the financial markets of the western industrial countries.  
However, Japan experienced a financial crisis almost two decades earlier involving many 
similar features to that of 2007-08 namely: rapid credit expansion and an asset price bubble 
concentrated particularly in the housing market, followed by a collapse and a sharp rise in bad 
debts, especially within the banking sector (Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka, 2000).  The 
Bank of Japan responded with what is now described as “unconventional” monetary policy: 
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aggressively buying assets to drive down short-term interest rates to zero followed in March 
2001 by a programme of large-scale asset purchases, effectively a policy of QE. 
There were two important consequences of the Bank of Japan’s policy.  First, the 
uncollateralized overnight (interbank) call rate ceased to act as a policy indicator.  With the 
call rate at zero, banks had little incentive to lend to one another in the uncollateralised 
overnight market when they could equally well hold risk-free reserves at the Bank of Japan at 
the same zero rate.  Non-interest costs for lenders were higher in the interbank market than 
with the Bank of Japan.  This was particularly stark in a setting in which the whole financial 
system was fragile following the crisis.  Banks with fragile balance sheets held excess 
reserves as precautionary balances against a run on their deposits.  Stronger banks had no 
wish to be contaminated by lending on an unsecured basis to riskier banks.  The increased 
reluctance of banks to transact in the overnight market led to a marked decline in trading 
volumes, and the interest rate became less informative of market conditions.  These issues 
were recognised by the Bank of Japan, as it changed its main operating target from the 
overnight call rate to the outstanding amount of banks’ reserves at the Bank of Japan 
(Shiratsuka, 2010).  Second therefore, large-scale asset purchases did not lead directly to an 
increase in the quantity of broad money but to a large increase in excess reserves reflected in 
bank current accounts at the Bank of Japan (Ogawa, 2004; Shiratsuka, 2010). 
It is therefore not entirely surprising that the 2007-08 financial crisis and the ensuing 
unconventional monetary policy measures such as QE have had effects which, in certain 
important respects, parallel those that had previously transpired in Japan.  We can divide the 
period into two: the crisis and its immediate aftermath, and implementation of large-scale QE. 
Initially, as the crisis unfolded, central banks intervened to inject liquidity into the banking 
system on an unprecedented scale, and sharply reduced their policy rates towards zero 
(Cecchetti, 2010).  However, there were important differences among the responses of central 
banks; for example the ECB intervened mainly through repo operations rather than the 
outright purchases undertaken by the Fed and the BoE (Joyce, Miles, Scott and Vayanos, 
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2012).  In interbank markets of all maturities, interest rates increased sharply and became 
substantially more volatile; and trading volumes declined.  In certain markets, lending dried 
up completely on some days, (Green 2011).  Angelini, Nobili and Picillo (2011) find that 
aggregate risk was much the most important determinant of lending and interest rate spreads 
in European interbank markets with a maturity of at least one week (ie. excluding overnight 
loans).  In fact, rate volatility and reluctance to lend were broadly comparable as between 
markets for secured and unsecured loans (Angelini et. al., 2011). 
In the overnight market, interest rates remained broadly anchored to central bank intervention 
rates, but volatility increased substantially.  Even though overnight markets are for unsecured 
loans they did not encounter any complete freezes that were experienced in some markets for 
longer-term debt (Afonso, Kovner and Schoar, 2011).  Indeed, volumes in the Federal funds 
market were not markedly affected by the financial crisis, notwithstanding the increased 
volatility in rates (Afonso, et al. 2011).  However, Acharya and Merrouche (2013) document 
a fall in volume in overnight sterling markets in London; and Gabrielli (2009) identifies falls 
of broadly similar orders of magnitude during 2007-08 in the euro zone.  These movements in 
aggregate trading volumes during the crisis mask a range of different influences.  Researchers 
concur that the overwhelming consideration underlying the evolution of the overnight market 
and the demand for central bank reserves in the crisis era and the period immediately 
following was the demand by banks for liquidity, particularly for precautionary purposes.  As 
in Japan earlier, banks were reluctant to lend in the overnight market first because of doubts 
about the credit-worthiness of the borrower and second because of concerns on the part of the 
lending bank about its own capital and solvency.  Several different factors may underpin this 
reluctance including incomplete contracting (Allen, Carletti and Gale, 2009) and asymmetric 
information (Cocco, Gomes and Martins, 2009). 
An important consideration for policy-makers is that short-term liquidity is in part a public 
good21.  Different banks experience different costs of borrowing depending on their perceived 
                                                           
21 Keynes was well aware of this issue: “… there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community 
as a whole.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 155). 
31 
 
individual characteristics.  However, evidence from the crisis shows that if some banks were 
affected by liquidity problems, it caused a rise in borrowing costs for all banks.  In times of 
crisis, the precautionary demand for liquidity tends to rise for all banks, thus reducing the 
supply of loans (Acharya and Merrouche, 2013).  If this effect were strong we would expect 
to see a relationship between the time series of overnight rates (level and volatility) and their 
cross-sectional dispersion.  Evidence from longer maturity interbank markets in the euro zone 
shows that the dispersion of rates among banks did rise during the crisis, especially for 
borrowers (Olmo, Iori and Kapar, 2014).  Gaspar et al. (2008) found that there was a 
relationship between the cross-sectional dispersion of rates and their time series volatility 
within the euro zone in the period 2000-04 well before the financial crisis.  It would be 
interesting to see if these relationships carry over to the crisis period. 
The UK is an interesting laboratory to test the demand for liquidity as banks can choose their 
own target reserve level from maintenance period to maintenance period.  The chosen reserve 
targets provide a more-or-less price-independent measure of demand.  Acharya and 
Merrouche (2013) find evidence for distinct arbitrage and liquidity effects in the UK, but they 
could equally be called a supply and a public good effect, respectively.  Arbitrage occurs in 
normal times when banks with excess liquidity release funds to lend to other banks; this tends 
to depress the interbank rate implying a negative relationship between liquidity and the 
interbank rate (the supply effect).  In the crisis, UK banks tended to hoard liquidity, especially 
on high transactions days, leading to a positive relation between liquidity and the overnight 
rate (the public good effect).  Somewhat similar results were obtained for the euro zone by 
Gabrieli (2009): banks that made greater use of the overnight market during the financial 
crisis experienced generally higher borrowing costs.  In addition, there were important 
differences between the unsecured and secured overnight market in the UK, with greater 
turbulence experienced in the market for loans which were secured (largely by UK 
government debt).  Acharya and Merrouche (2013) attribute these differences to a selection 
effect; only the most highly-rated settlement banks were able to trade on an unsecured basis in 
the overnight market.  Therefore the stresses to which weaker banks were subject were 
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reflected primarily in the market for secured loans.  In contrast, in the euro zone there were 
few identifiable differences between secured and unsecured interbank markets during the 
crisis, at least at longer maturities than overnight (Angelini et. al., 2011). 
The second phase was the aftermath of the crisis.  Over this period, central bank policies have 
had two key effects on the overnight market and the demand for reserves that are broadly 
similar to those of the Bank of Japan over a decade earlier.  First, in the overnight market, 
interest rates have fallen to the bottom of the corridor used by central banks, and the volatility 
of the rate has generally declined from the crisis period.  Second, volumes traded in overnight 
markets have tended to decline sharply (Jackson and Sim, 2013).  Research on these outcomes 
has concentrated on the special features of QE in generating a huge increase in bank reserves 
(Afonso and Lagos, 2015).  However, the earlier contribution of Furfine (2000) demonstrated 
the importance of the dual functions of bank reserves that we drew attention to in section 2, 
namely that they are used for monetary management and to finance the payments mechanism.  
Furfine verified that banks with higher excess reserves are better able to manage payments 
shocks with less recourse to the interbank market, implying reduced interbank transactions, 
and a lower and less volatile interbank rate.  It is therefore not really surprising that the huge 
increase in excess reserves has had these same effects for the banking system as a whole. 
Second, there has been a massive increase in excess reserves held at central banks with little 
significant impact on the growth of broad money in any of the countries in which QE has 
been implemented (Goodhart and Ashworth, 2012).  The reasons for these outcomes are still 
being worked out.  See the recent theoretical contributions of Afonso and Lagos (2015) in the 
federal funds market and Hauck and Neyer (2014) on the euro zone.  However, it seems clear 
that the increase in reserves does reflect in part an increase in precautionary demand and 
corresponding reluctance to engage in unsecured overnight borrowing or lending 
These developments raise a more general question about the future of the overnight market, at 
least as long as unconventional monetary policy is in place (Borio and Disyatat, 2010).  Once 
the main policy interest rate reached its zero bound with a commitment that it would remain 
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there, central banks were no longer employing an interest rate as their main operational target.  
Instead they were targeting bank reserves through QE.  In its 2001 initiation of QE, the Bank 
of Japan acknowledged this explicitly, switching from the call money rate to bank reserves as 
the key operating target.  Western central banks have generally continued to treat the interest 
rate as their ostensible operating target, notwithstanding that it appears nugatory.  If trading in 
overnight markets is thin and banks have excess reserves on the scale that has followed from 
QE, the overnight rate may be of little value as policy indicator.  This underlines the need for 
central banks to have clear exit strategies from QE (Borio and Disyatat, 2010). 
Available estimates suggest that there is a very high cross-elasticity of demand for central 
bank reserves with respect to the overnight rate.  Ogawa (2004) estimated that a 5 basis points 
increase in the Japanese overnight call rate could have been sufficient to reduce excess 
reserves by up to 40% following the Japanese crisis and its own QE which began in 2001.  
Marquez, Morse and Schlusche (2013) estimate that a $1tr (or about 2/3) cut in excess 
reserves would raise the Federal funds rate by only about 25 basis points following the Fed’s 
QE programme.  The estimates of Marquez et. al. are based on a simultaneous model of 
reserve demand and interest rate determination whereas Ogawa’s model is a single-equation 
(reduced form) demand function for reserves.  However, Ogawa’s study contains an important 
element not considered by Marquez et. al. namely, an allowance for bad loans.  We would 
expect the cross-elasticity of reserve demand to be very sensitive to the underlying soundness 
of individual banks and to the system as a whole.  Ogawa estimated that if the 5 basis point 
rise in the call rate is accompanied by a 50% cut in banks’ non-performing loans, excess 
reserves would decline by over 50%.  These estimates do not however, fully address the more 
important issue of how the excess reserves are to be extinguished, whether by a decrease in 
reserve supply or an increase in broad money.  Evidently it is the former that is desired. 
8  Concluding Remarks 
The overnight interbank market is closely linked with the market for bank reserves, providing 
“next-to-last-resort” unsecured borrowing facilities for commercial banks.  The literature 
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suggests that this creates the need for networks involving long-term banking relationships.  
Interbank networks tend to develop a “core-periphery” structure based on these relationships.  
A sparse network of this kind can be vulnerable to contagion, but this depends in part on the 
characteristics and position of each bank in the network.  Under certain conditions sparse 
networks can be less vulnerable to contagion.  There is also evidence that networking 
promotes the monitoring of borrowers by lenders, creating some degree of market discipline.  
The vulnerability to contagion of any network changes over time and more needs to be 
understood about how to recognise when vulnerability increases to dangerous levels. 
Theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of the overnight interest rate suggest 
that it is influenced by a range of factors, including daily payment flows and central bank and 
operations, especially interest rates, reserve requirements and open market policies.  The 
substitutability between overnight loans and bank reserves depends on the relative costs of 
transacting in these markets, including interest and non-interest costs such as collateralisation.  
Aggregate liquidity shocks affect the equilibrium rate unless the central bank increases the 
supply of bank reserves.  Shocks that redistribute liquidity among banks can also affect the 
rate through several different channels.  A redistributive shock alters the inter-bank dispersion 
of borrowing and lending in the market and therefore the cross-sectional distribution of rates 
paid and charged.  Temporary payments shocks may be managed through market mechanisms, 
but if the shock is permanent it may affect the perception or reality of the soundness of 
individual banks.  Because of the risks of contagion, the market for overnight loans contains 
elements of a public good: an improvement or deterioration in the quality of a few banks’ 
balance sheets may affect the rates charged on all loans, not just those to the affected banks. 
Bank reserves (and therefore overnight loans) are not perfect inter-temporal substitutes across 
maintenance periods; and there is also strong evidence that they are not perfect substitutes 
within a single maintenance period, partly because of transactions costs and other frictions 
and also because of asymmetries inherent in reserve maintenance systems.  There is abundant 
evidence of predictable movements in the conditional mean and variance of the overnight rate, 
both within the day and between days in any single maintenance period.  The time-paths of 
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mean and variance are system-dependent and vary across countries; but they are broadly 
related to the institutional arrangements in each country particularly for reserve requirements 
and central bank intervention.  However, there is some evidence of efficiency in respect of 
central bank policies in the US and euro zone where expected policy announcements have 
been found to have a greater impact on mean and variance than the announcements 
themselves.  This would suggest that these central banks do communicate effectively with the 
market.  Empirical modelling of the overnight rate tends to confirm that the conditional mean 
and variance are determined by a complex set of factors, including other short-term interest 
rates, central bank rates, the exchange rate (where the central bank has an exchange rate target) 
and relevant quantities, such as the amount and terms of central bank operations, and daily 
fluctuations in payment flows through the settlement system.  Measures of the cross-sectional 
dispersion in daily transactions also help explain the time series pattern of the average rate. 
The 2007-08 financial crisis has wrought substantial changes in central bank policy-making 
and intervention tools and in the role of the overnight market, at least in the major industrial 
countries principally affected by the crisis.  Trading in the major overnight markets is less 
active as banks prefer to lend to the central bank rather than to one another, and the overnight 
rate has lost much of its policy importance in the major industrial countries.  There have been 
some substantial theoretical contributions to understanding overnight markets but there has 
been less empirical work.  Much more remains to be done in understanding if the overnight 
market has a new role to play or if it will eventually revert fully to its traditional functions.  
The main omission from this survey concerns overnight markets in emerging economies.  
There are many such markets (BIS, 1999) but most research on emerging economies has been 
concerned with interbank markets in general, rather than with the overnight market in 
particular, and with a focus on networking and contagion.  There are relatively few research 
results on the determinants of overnight rates in emerging markets and their relation to 
monetary policy22.  Few emerging markets experienced the same financial trauma of 2007-08 
                                                           
22 An important issue is that relatively few countries dispose of readily available separate data on transactions in 
the overnight markets.  Even for the US, Furfine’s (1999) seminal contribution was based on estimated 
transactions in federal funds rather than the actuals.  We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
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as the industrial west, and their overnight markets have mostly not gone into reverse.  
Research on the main western markets shows that the behaviour of overnight rates is linked 
inextricably to distinctive institutional conditions in each market.  These considerations 
suggest that an important priority is to continue to extend research on overnight markets to a 
wider range of countries to better understand the variety of experience and the lessons to be 
learnt for monetary policy and the banking system. 
Overall, the main contributions of this paper are five.  First, we provide a selective survey of 
the literature on overnight interbank markets, concentrating on the major industrial countries, 
at the opportune time when these markets are attracting increasing interest from researchers, 
policy makers, and practitioners.  Second, we outline the typical structure of overnight 
markets and their relationship to bank reserves; we explain the potential conflicts faced by 
central banks between the provision of reserves for payments purposes and reserves required 
for meeting monetary policy objectives.  Third, we identify critical issues in networking in 
overnight markets.  The literature does not yet provide clear answers as to whether complete 
or incomplete networks are more robust in limiting contagion from the failure of individual 
banks; this is a promising research area, calling for innovative research approaches.  Fourth, 
we explain the theory of and document key empirical results concerning the determination of 
the overnight interbank rate.  The overnight rate typically displays predictable daily 
movements within and between bank reserve maintenance periods; these regularities vary 
among countries and can generally be traced to the institutional structure of reserve 
management in a country. Fifth, we identify important changes in the structure and 
functioning of overnight markets following the 2007-08 financial crisis.  Markets have tended 
to become less liquid following the crisis and there remain important issues concerning future 
market developments as central banks seek to move normalise monetary policy from their 
post-crisis use of unorthodox policies such as large-scale asset purchases. 
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